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Seeking the reset button – Russia’s role in NATO’s new Strategic Concept
It was quite the event when the soon-to-be-retired
Secretary General of NATO, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer,
opened the pubic discussion over the new Strategic
Concept on 7 July 2009. More than 400 representa-
tives from politics, academia, the military and the
media participated in the effort to help define
NATO’s new road map for the next decade. By
August 2009, some changes will already be evident:
the alliance is modernizing by appointing Anders
Fogh Rasmussen as the new Secretary General and
modifying the Strategic Concept, the authoritative
statement of the Alliance’s political and military
objectives. In doing so, the alliance is acting on the
maxim: ”renewal through re-
opening”. But as it seeks to
define a new sphere of influ-
ence in the international securi-
ty environment, NATO cannot
ignore Russia’s military reinvi-
goration and its presence in the
realm of global security. And indeed, NATO-Russia
relations were an important topic at the anniversary
summit in April 2009. In his closing address at the
seminar, De Hoop Scheffer pointed out that the alli-
ance intends to collaborate intensively with Russia.
Making NATO-Russia cooperation a priority in the
new Strategic Concept could be symbolic of a new
era, helping to leave the past behind and make the
former foe a partner. As U.S. President Barack
Obama has said, it’s time to ”reset” the relationship
and work together.
The NATO-Russia relationship suffered after the
outbreak of hostilities in the Georgian provinces of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia in August 2008. The
peacekeeping model for South Ossetia, in which
Russia had the role of a negotiator in the region, col-
lapsed with the entry of the Russian army into the
province. Strenuous efforts, led by the European
Union, to establish peace in the secessional regions
resulted in the six-principle agreement, signed by
the Georgian President Saakashvili and the Russian
President Medvedev. Nevertheless, the Russian
decision to extend recognition to South Ossetia and
Abkhazia showed that there is still a lack of under-
standing between Russia and NATO. They are play-
ing the same game, trying to define their role in this
newly defined area of international security, but the
rules are not clear.
In essence, NATO’s new Stra-
tegic Concept is all about
making new rules. While rela-
tions with Russia have affected
NATO’s strategy since the
inception of the alliance, it was
the end of the Cold War era and
the changing political situation in Europe that led to
the publishing of the first official Strategic Concept
in 1991 and to the staging of a new public debate
over the future of the military alliance. In 1999,
when a renewed Strategic Concept was presented, it
was ostensibly NATO’s engagement in Kosovo –
NATO’s first military operation outside the tradi-
tional sphere of action – and the need for a new
understanding of enemies, combat fields, threats and
risks that provided the impetus. Behind the scenes,
the Kosovo War led to intense strains in NATO-
Russia relations, underscored by Russia’s implemen-
tation of a plan to push its own forces into Kosovo.
Later that year, Russian participation in the
Permanent Joint Council (PJC), a precursor of the
NATO-Russia Council (NRC), was suspended. In
the same year, NATO began the process of Eastern
“Making NATO-Russia cooperation a
priority in the new Strategic Concept
could be symbolic of a new era,
helping to leave the past behind and
make the former foe a partner.”
On 7 July 2009, NATO officially opened the debate over the alliance’s new Strategic Concept. Over the course of
its history, the military alliance has evolved from a coalition of states, aligned together against the threat posed
by the Soviet Union, into a truly global entity, affiliated with other organisations and international actors and
faced with new threats in the areas of security and defence. Seeking a new raison d’être, NATO is going back to
its roots; working more closely with Russia is one of the most important goals for NATO in the near future. But
what role will Russia play in NATO’s search for a new identity – enemy or “frenemy”? Now is the time to re-
define the NATO-Russia relationship and to create a new set of regulations in order to promote the cooperation
needed in today’s world security order.
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Enlargement. With Poland, the Czech Republic and
Hungary becoming NATO members, Russia’s view
of NATO changed. NATO was no longer seen as a
potential partner, but as an enemy. Finally, the
NATO-Russia founding act, established in 1997,
failed to meet expectations and became obsolete.
Boosting cooperation in the NRC
After 9/11, the international security environment
fundamentally changed and led to a revival of
NATO-Russia relations. With the establishment of
the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in 2002, a new
quality of relationship has been
reached between the military
alliance and the Russian Feder-
ation. Unfortunately, the NRC
never became an important 
forum for discussion it was in-
tended to be. The NRC’s agenda covered only the
issues over which NATO and Russia did not really
disagree. The situation in Georgia, NATO member-
ship of Georgia and Ukraine, the dispute about the
American missile defence systems in Poland and the
Czech Republic, the conventional arms control in
Europe, the awkward situation in Afghanistan and
Iraq and the nuclear threat posed Iran were and are
still not topics of priority in the NRC, as they un-
doubtedly should be. For two reasons, the NRC is
the primary instrument through which better mutu-
al understanding between Russia and NATO can be
achieved. Firstly, the forum is intended to be a zone
where NATO and Russia meet as equal partners,
each bearing equal responsibility for the decisions
made in the council. Secondly, the NRC is designed
to focus on all areas of interest to both parties. Since
2002, these areas have expanded. As a result, the
NRC not only provides the mechanisms to promote
cooperation between NATO and Russia on topics
where interests coincide, but also offers ways to con-
front new threats and challenges, where NATO and
the Russian Federation may not share broad agree-
ment.
At this point, NATO will have to decide whether its
new Strategic Concept will regard Russia as a part-
ner or a “frenemy”. The signs of the times point
towards the first option. Having overcome the
suspension of the NRC cooperation after the
Russian military action in Georgia in early August
2008, the NATO foreign ministers met in June 2009
in Corfu and decided to review the current state of
NATO-Russia relations by reviving the NRC and
pointing out the strategic importance of the NRC for
security in the Euro-Atlantic area. In the beginning
of June 2009, American President Barack Obama
embraced the opportunity and emphasised his high
expectations for renewed relations between Russia
and the West. In his introductory remarks at the
opening of the Strategic Concept seminar in the
beginning of July 2009, NATO Secretary General
Jaap de Hoop Scheffer stressed the importance of
defining NATO’s essential interests and objectives
with respect to Russia and of seeing the NATO-
Russia Council as a body to articulate not only com-
mon differences but also common interests. These
include key issues like non-
proliferation, cooperation in
the maritime security environ-
ment and the struggle against
global terrorism. It’s time for
the NRC to reach adulthood.
Handle Russia means handle Russia with care
One should not expect the new Strategic Concept to
be completely reworked—it is more likely that only
some crucial points will be modified. NATO’s global
sphere of action could finally be established legiti-
mately, supplementing the territorial limits defined
in the Article 6 of the NATO treaty. To assist in this
regard, NATO could define its openness not only to
new members but also to new organisations as co-
operation partners. This would require a level of co-
hesion among NATO members well above the
amount exhibited in the current alliance, which is
operating disjointedly. To combat this trend, the idea
of NATO à la carte should be downplayed. Solidarity
is the new morality and will have to be highlighted
in the new Strategic Concept. Finally, the financial
crisis has not left NATO unaffected. Acting on a
more and more global scale and inventing more and
more extensive and therefore expensive operations
requires a higher financial commitment from the
member states. Even if one disregards the impact of
the global financial crisis, the drawn-out, ongoing
security and development mission in Afghanistan
shows the need for extensive capabilities today and
in the future.
It is undeniable that Russia could be a helpful part-
ner in meeting these challenges. Russia may have a
lot to offer, from military transit support for
Afghanistan to involvement in negotiations with
Iran, but its cooperation would come at high cost.
There are two crucial points that NATO should
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“Solidarity is the new morality and will
have to be highlighted in the new
Strategic Concept.”
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always consider as it attempts to build a cooperative
relationship with Russia: Russia’s view of the world
and Russia’s view of NATO.
Russia’s view of the world differs from NATO’s view,
as Russia considers itself an equal of the United
States on the world stage, a nation on its way to
becoming a great power again. As a result, the coun-
try claims a sort of influence in those regions that it
regards as areas of “national interest”. Respecting
this issue is the first step to rebuilding ties with
Russia. Expounding the popular view that the
Russian influence ends at its doorstep is counterpro-
ductive and intensifies tensions between Russia and
NATO.
Russia’s view of NATO is
ambivalent. From Russia’s side,
NATO has not done much in
the past to support the country.
For the Russian government, a
military confrontation with NATO was always a re-
alistic option. The suspicion of NATO has been
increased by the eastward expansion of the alliance,
which clashed with Russia’s conception of its own
power. Russia also fears that NATO is pressuring
post-Soviet countries to become involved in the
international (military) mission of the alliance and is
therefore gaining influence in the immediate
Russian neighbourhood.
In good and in bad times – NATO-Russia rela-
tions as they should be
Only with an understanding of common cooperative
interests can NATO act appropriately. The most
urgent ground for cooperation today is in security
and economic issues. To date, NATO’s focus has
been centred on Afghanistan and Iran. Moscow cul-
tivates a strong dialogue with Teheran and Kabul
and, although the Russian influence in these coun-
tries is limited, NATO can only benefit from Russian
support when trying to begin talks with the mode-
rate Taliban or with the Iranian government.
Furthermore, the ability to transport material across
the Russian territory is extremely valuable to NATO.
While unlikely to send troops to Afghanistan in the
near future, Russia could intensify its efforts with
combating drug traffic and securing borders. The
other huge field of common interests is the econom-
ic cooperation. The financial crisis impacted Russia
to an unexpected degree. Russia is suffering from
numerous bailout appeals, bank failures and, most
of all, declining earnings from exports. Oil and gas
make up a large percentage of Russian exports, but
following the financial crisis the record-high energy
prices have plummeted and with them the huge
financial reserves of the Russian government. NATO
is devoting considerable attention to ensuring ener-
gy supplies, especially in Western Europe, in order to
avoid the security issues that are often triggered by
disputes over energy sources. With Russia as one of
the main gas and oil suppliers for many NATO
member states, a dialogue with Russia in these
financially troubled times could not only help
Russia to break the bottleneck, but also secure the
energy supply for the Western European countries
for decades.
If NATO plans to work with
Russia in a respectful and
friendly manner, it should not
send ambiguous signals. While
the Russian government does
not help improve NATO-Russia relations by launch-
ing threats every time NATO violates Russian
“national security interests”, NATO should set a
good example and speak clearly about its claims and
expectations. Promising membership to Ukraine and
Georgia but then suspending the membership
negotiations is one example of unreliability. Like-
wise, initiating diplomatic overtures but then under-
mining efforts by recalling past disagreements, as
Vice-President Joseph R. Biden did at the end of July
2009 during a trip to Georgia and Ukraine, does not
lead to better relations between NATO and the
Russian Federation.
Reinvigorating cooperation within the NRC is cru-
cial for effective cooperation with Russia. The NRC
should become a forum for official and unofficial
debates about the current hot-button issues. It pre-
sents a unique opportunity for NATO and Russia to
develop new projects from current disputes, such as
missile defence. Since the United States, Europe and
Russia all have an interest in missile defence due to
the potential nuclear threat from Iran, the NRC
could be the forum for developing and implement-
ing such a huge military project. “Speak less, do
more” has been the NATO strategy of choice in the
NRC until today.“Speak more, achieve more”would
be a better motto.
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“‘Speak less, do more’ has been the
NATO strategy of choice in the NRC
until today. ‘Speak more, achieve
more’ would be a better motto.”
Throughout all this, NATO should avoid adopting a
carrot-and-stick policy towards Russia. Accepting
Russia as a partner in good and bad times is the best
way to eliminate prejudices. Establishing a new
Strategic Concept presents an exceptional opportu-
nity to provide Russia with validation and to push a
reset button which, expressed in a future-oriented
strategic paper, could ultimately benefit all parties.
The new Strategic Concept should not be based on
what happened in 1989 or in 1999, but what is hap-
pening in 2009. Today, we have a multilateral NATO
that matters. In order to maintain this importance
and to prepare the alliance for the unpredictabilities
of the next decade, some things must be made pre-
dictable. The NATO-Russia relationship is one of
them.
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